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Foreign Direct Investments-Threat or 
Chance? 
Foreign direct investments are not always wel-
come. Globalization may be a chance or may be 
a threat. Many countries in the world erect 
barriers against foreign investments or discrimi-
nate foreign companies to protect their domestic 
markets and their domestic companies from 
takeovers. Germany with its export-based 
economy is continously struggling for free mar-
ket access for direct foreign investments in all 
countries of the world. The main target of the 
German Federal Government is to achieve a 
multilateral rules-based system for direct for-
eign investments including the following core 
 points  : 
  • Free market access (equal opportunities to 
   start businesses in foreign countries) . 
• Non-discrimination of foreign companies . 
  • Legal protection (free transfer of capital 
   and profits, protection against expropria-
   tion, conflict mediation) . 
The European Union is currently trying to 
achieve a compromise on these questions with 
the developing countries : 
• A limitation on direct investments (without 
   short-term capital transfers) . 
• Special rules for developing countries (sus-
   tainable development, deadlines) .   
• Confirmation of regulating powers of the 
    host states (environment, social affairs) . 
   • Rules for ,, investor's behavior". ?
         Volker Eichener 
Despite Germany's determination towards 
globalized markets, even here not every for-
eign investment is welcome. The largest for-
eign direct investment that ever occurred in 
Germany, the takeover of the telecommunica-
tions company Mannesmann by the British com-
pany Vodafone , was heavily fought by 
Nordrhein-Westfalen's State Government, how-
ever without success. 
Butgenerally,foreigninvestmentsin Nordrhein-
Westfalen (NRW) are highly prized because 
they contribute to the creation of employment 
in a state that is heavily struck by structural 
change and unemployment. NRW has been 
open to foreign investments for a long time and 
treats German branches of foreign companies as 
domestic companies. This includes that the po-
litical instruments to attract foreign investors 
are, with few exceptions (like marketing of-
fices in foreign countries) , the same as to 
stimulate domestic industry. Therefore, after 
a brief statistical overview, I will outline the 
development of industrial policy in NRW before 
I will depict special activities to encourage for-
eign direct investments. 
The Situation : Statistical Overview 
Nordrhein-Westfalen (NRW) is a state of the 
Federal Republic of Germany. NRW has 18 mil-
lion inhabitants, that is 22% of Germany's total 
population. NRW's gross domestic product is 
456 billion EURO which is 22.4% of Germany's
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GDP and 5.4% of the total GDP of the EU. 
Thus the GDP of NRW exceeds that of Austra-
lia. NRW's economic structure was historically 
characterized by coal and steel industries, how-
ever, due to structural change, the traditional 
industries have declined. Today, NRW has a 
wide range of different industries and serv-
ices, including machinery, chemical industry, 
automotive, telecommunication etc. 
Foreign direct investments to NRW have been 
worth of  85.7 billion EURO in 1999 which is 30% 
of the total foreign direct investments to Ger-
many. The most important investors come 
from : 
1. the Netherlands 19. 4% 
2. USA18.7% 





67% of the foreign direct investments come 
from EU countries. 
Among foreign companies which have locations 
in NRW are : Ford Motor Company, General 
Motors, 3 M, Hewlett-Packard, Procter&Gam-
ble, Warner Brothers, Vodafone, Sammi Steel, 
Alps Electric, Denon Nippon, Mitsubishi, 
Fuji, Sony, Toshiba. 
Japanese Investments in Duesseldorf : A 
Tight Regional Cluster 
In particular, the state capital Duesseldorf is a 
stronghold of Japanese investments to Ger-
many. 420 Japanese companies have their loca-
tions in Duesseldorf (NRW total : 500) , and 
5, 500 Japanese people are living in Duesseldorf 
(NRW total : 7, 200) . These figures indicate 
that Japanes companies form an extremely tight 
regional cluster. Duesseldorf is by no means 
the only location in NRW which is suited for
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Japanese investments. Koeln , Aachen , Bonn , 
the whole Ruhr Area (which is roughly ten 
times as large as Duesseldorf) form attractive 
locations for foreign direct investments too. 
However, Japanes investments tend to cluster 
in an extremely small geographical area. Some 
spreading of Japanese plants into Duesseldorf's 
suburban area rather confirm this clustering. 
The spatial cluster of Japanese investments is 
closely related to the emergence of a Japanese 
cultural and social infrastructure in Duessel-
dorf. Already in 1964 a Japanese Club was 
founded in Duesseldorf, 1971 a Japanese school 
followed which has today 700 students, and in 
1983 a Japanese Kindergarten was opened. 
There is a Japanese Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry in Duesseldorf, and lots of Japa-
nese-German cultural events and institutions. 
There is a Japanese Duesseldorf, a Japanese 
bookstore, two Japanese grocery stores, and 
several Japanese banks. You find a dozen or so 
Japanese restaurants in Duesseldorf which 
serve authentic Japanese cuisine for Japanese 
and German customers. Most of these activities 
are even concentrated in a small section of one 
street in downtown Duesseldorf, the Immer-
mannstrasse. 
However, Japanese direct investments to Ger-
many have somewhat declined. Today, as a 
target country for Japanese investments, Ger-
many is only ranking three in the European Un-
ion behind the Netherlands and United King-
dom. Both countries currently boost higher fig-
ures in economic growth. 
Phases of Industrial Policy in Nordrhein-West-
falen 
Industrial policy in Nordrhein-Westfalen devel-
oped in five steps. This does not mean that in-
dustrial policy was completely changed from 
step to step but that in each phase new ap-
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proaches were added to the instruments that 
had been implemented in former steps. 
Step  1 :  Passive, real estate focused economic devel-
opment cooperation 
For a long time , industrial policy in 
Nordrhein-Westfalen was very traditional. Eco-
nomic development cooperation was quite pas-
sive in the sense that it was waiting for inter-
ested firms to approach them. In this phase, 
economic development cooperation concentrated 
on real estate which meant finding sites for in-
dustrial locations. Nordrhein-Westfalen's Eco-
nomic Development Corporation still provides a 
real estate database for industrial and commer-
cial sites. It was the period when the economy 
boomed and sites were scarce, not invest-
ments. This phase ended with the first eco-
nomic crisis in the mid-seventies, when espe-
cially the steel industry faced a severe crisis 
and unemployment rose sharply. 
Step 2 : Incentive programmes 
Triggered by crisis, industrial policy was 
forced to play a more active role to attract in-
vestments and, hence, employment. The first 
answer to crisis was subsidizing. It was the 
phase when the Ministry of Economics started 
its first incentive programmes, e. g. the „ 
Technologieprogramm Wirtschaft" (technology 
programme for business) . In particular, the 
programmes gave financial incentives to intro-
duce modern technologies.
 gramme. 
• State-run venture 
 funds. 
• Bank guarantees . 








Current Incentive Programmes in NRW 
These incentive programmes which are tar-
geted both to domestic enterprises and for-
eign investors (which have the same legal 
status as domestic enterprises since they 
have established a firm in Germany) include : 
• A business consulting programme . 
• A business technology programme . 
• A regional economic development pro-
However, the success of this approach was lim-
ited. The main problem was that the pro-
grammes were not specific enough. In this pe-
riod, this approach got a popular name to indi-
cate that a lot of public money was  wasted  : the 
„ watering-can approach " („ Giesskannenprin-
zip") . Like a watering-can, these subsidies 
were also given to firms which not really 
needed them. 
Step 3 : Regionalization of industrial policy 
The main problem of the general incentive pro-
grammes was that the Duesseldorf-located Min-
istry did not really know how to spend the 
money most effectively and efficiently. Another 
problem was that in the economic regions the 
different actors-the chambers of commerce and 
industry, the municipal economic cooperation 
units, the firms, the universities, the labor un-
ions-competed for the incentives and very often 
blocked each other's activities. For instance, if 
the labor union proposed a vocational training 
center the chamber of commerce and industry 
would oppose while the chamber would in turn 
face union resistance if they wanted public 
money for a technology transfer center. 
The model for an entirely new approach to in-
dustrial policy to overcome these problems 
evolved in one region : in the region of Dort-
mund (in the Ruhr Area) which was severely 
struck by a crisis of a regional steel company. 
Shocked by a 50% -cutback of employment by 
this steel company, the regional actors aban-
doned their traditions of conflict and were able 
to find institutional arrangements for mutual co-
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operation. Iin particular, they agreed on a 
two-fold strategy to promote both the second la-
bor market, which was in the interest of the 
unions, and new technologies, which was de-
manded by business, and they started a 
joint-venture of local government and chamber
 grammes including the lists of projects. 
5. The Ministry started to distribute its sub-
 sidies according to the agreed projects thus 
 giving a premium and incentive for consen-
  sus.
of commerce and industry to start a technology 
center. This joint-venture technology center 
eventually spawned a technology-centered busi-
ness park and is today, almost 20 years after its 
origin, among Germany's most successful tech-
nology centers. 
Encouraged by the success of the Dortmund 
model, in the mid-eighties, the Ministry gener-
alized the approach to a new strategy of indus-
trial policy : the regionalization of industrial pol-
icy in Nordrhein-Westfalen . Regionalization 
comprised of several steps : 
The regionalization of industrial policy was so
Steps of regionalization 
1. The state was divided into 16 regions 
  (which usually included several towns and 
 cities and which were roughly identical 
 with the chamber of commerce and indus-
 try districts) . 
2. The regions developed fora for discussion 
 and consensus-building, in particular the 
  regional conferences and working-groups. 
 In any case, not only local governments 
 participated in the regional conferences but 
 also the chambers, the labor unions and a 
  broad range of regional associations, 
 groups and institutions. 
3. The regions had to develop „regional de-
 velopment programmes". These regional 
 development programmes usually included 
 an analytical part, a vision for the region's 
 development and a catalogue of projects. 
4. The regional actors had to achieve a con-
  sensus on the regional development pro-
successful that most other German states 
adopted the approach which was also highly 
prized by the Commission of the European Un-
ion. An evaluation of the programme proved 
that the approach indeed stimulated cooperation 
within the regions (Heinze/Voelzkow 1997) . 
Projects could be realized that had been 
blocked by decades. 
A main instrument of regionalized industrial pol-
icy are technology centers. Up to now, in 
NRW 69 technology centers have been opened 
which host 1, 800 companies and 14, 000 employ-
ees. The most successful technology centers 
are affiliated to universities (and are often lo-
cated on the campus) and are technology-cen-
tered. 
There are large variations in the degree of suc-
Services provided by technology centers 
• Service-oriented welcome packages for 
  firms. 
• Bundling of innovative activities . 
• Technological expertise . 
• Synergy effects . 
• Business operation assistance . 
• Professional infrastructure . 
• Cooperation with universities and research 
 institutes. 
• Lab , office and production space. 
• Market proximity . 
• Attractive work environment . 
• A good business adress .
cess of the technology 
al. 1996, Sternberg 1996) 
ticular Dortmund and
centers (Sternberg et 
. Some centers-in par-
Aachen-are extremely
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successful and have greatly expanded, mostly 
by moving the mature firms into adjacent tech-
nology parks (the Dortmund technology center 
hosts about 1, 000 employess, while in the adja-
cent technology park almost 4, 000 employees 
are working) . On the other hand, there are 
many smaller centers which do not operate 
very successfully, in particular if the mix of 
firms is too broad and if the centers are not af-
filiated to a university or research institute. 
Step 4 : Branch-specific incentive programmes 
Regionalization had the advantage that the 
knowledge of the regional actors could be used 
for directing the flow of public funds. How-
ever, it failed to cope with a new problem : the 
decline of whole industrial branches, in particu-
lar the textile industry and the construction in-
dustry. Therefore, in the mid-nineties, the 
Ministry of Economics started several new in-
itiatives which are focused on certain industrial 
branches.
Current branch-focused Industrial Policies 
in NRW 
• Future initiative for the construction indus-
 try ( Zukunftsinitiative Bauwirtschaft-Z-
 IBAU) . 
• Future initiative for the textile industry 
  (Zukunftsinitiative Textilindustrie-ZITEX) . 
• Skilled workers for information technologies 
  (Fachkraefte fuer IT-Technologien-FIT) . 
• Joint initiative for automotive suppliers 
  (Verbundinitiative Automobilzulieferer) . 
• Bio-and GeneTech initiative in NRW (Bio -
 Gen Tech NRW) .
A branch-focused programme may include a lot 
of different activities, like common marketing 
projects , technology-transfer projects , re-
search & development programmes, consulting 
programmes, vocational training programmes 
etc. Usually the Ministry of Economics, some-
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times other ministries too, the relevant indus-
trial associations, research institutes and con-
sultants are involved in these programmes. 
In some cases-in particular in case of the BioGe-
neTech initiative-the approach to concentrate 
on a specific branch is combined with the re-
gionalization approach, resulting in branch-specific 
activities in selected regions. 
Step 5 : Business type-focused programmes 
The latest approach, which was introduced in 
the late nineties, are programmes which are fo-
cused on specific business types. So far, NRW 
has developed two of such programmes : the in-
itiative for small and medium-sized enterprises 
MOVE and the start-up initiative GO!
„Mittelstands-Offensive MOVE"-small and 
medium sized enterprises initiative 
• Installation of a service hotline with 3 
  -days-service for contacts between busi-
 nesses and public administration. 
• Technology transfer activities . 
• Venture capital funds , business angel net-
  works, turn-around funds. 
• A campaign to help enterprises accessing 
 foreign markets.
„ Griindungs-Offensive GO ! -start-up initia-
tive 
• Stimulation of start-ups at schools and uni-
  versities. 
• An advertising campaign for start-ups . 
• Consulting for start-ups . 
• Business plan contests and evaluations . 
• Seed and venture capital funds . 
• A cooperation exchange . 
• A business succession exchange . 
• Trade fair support .
Today, industrial policy in 
combines instruments of
Nordrhein-Westfalen 
all five Steps : Of
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course, there are still services to find sites ; 
there are also several general incentive pro-
grammes ; there are technology-centered pro-
grammes and there are programmes for certain 
business types and most of these activities rely 
on regionalized infrastructures. 
Activities of the Economic Development 
Corporation Nordrhein-Westfalen to At-
tract Foreign Investments 
Some years ago, the Ministry of Economics of 
NRW has founded a corporation called „Ge-
sellschaft fur Wirtschaftsfoerderung Nordrhein-West-
falen (GFW) " or „Economic Development Cor-
poration". The GFW's website in German and 
English is : http : //www. gfw-nrw. de and 
the Japanese version is : http : //www. nrw. 
co. jp. The GFW has offices also in Tokyo, in 
Korea, in China and in Singapore. 
The GFW's core activities are : 
• A real estate database for industrial and 
   commercial sites with a site selection serv-
    ice.   
• Market and business sector analyses . 
  • Consulting services . 
• Consulting on the various incentive pro-
    grammes. 
• Support during the realization of invest-
   ment projects. 
Additional acitivities include 
• Theme trips to NRW . 
• Marketing acitivities in foreign countries , 
   particularly in Japan (a press conference
   and seminar in fall 1999, a film on Japanese 
   cable tv, articles in the Nikkei Business 
newspaper) . 
• The publication of the German Tax Re-
    port. 
• Support in crisis situations . 
The GFW is a reaction to the globalization of 
the economy. Before the GFW was founded as
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a state agency, economic development coopera-
tion was a municipal affair. However, no sin-
gle city in NRW is able to act on the global mar-
ket, hence, the state government decided to 
start a state-wide agency as a public corpora-
tion of private law. 
Combined Approaches to Attract Foreign 
Investments : the BioTech Example 
The BioTech and GeneTech technology is con-
sidered a „shooting star" among the most prom-
ising industrial branches. The BioTech indus-
try is a very young industry in the phase of the 
„take-off" with a lot of start-ups and extremely 
high growing rates. BioTech research and de-
velopment is highly globalized, quite certainly 
with U. S. universities, research institutes 
and innovative firms in the lead (Ernst&Young 
1998) . 
There are three types of foreign investments to 
be found in the BioTech industry : 
1. Large foreign firms open up German 
 branches on a large scale (with more than 
  100 employees) . 
2. Small foreign firms open up small German 
 branches with just a few employees. 
3. Researchers from foreign countries start 
  new companies in Germany (e. g. researchers 
 who have done research work in the USA 
  and who want to start an enterprise in 
Europe) . 
There are a few investments of the first type in 
Germany with 100 thru 200 jobs created, but 
most of the investments in BioTech industry 
are of type 2 or type 3 with less than 10 employ-
ees at the time of the start-up. 
For such small investments, the situation is 
particularly difficult : 
• They need lab , production and office space 
   which is ready for occupancy. 
• They need a lot of public permits to oper-
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   ate business (in particular regarding safety 
matters) . 
• They need information about patents and 
   patent law. 
  • They need research cooperation . 
  • They need access to public research funds . 
  • They need personnel . 
Typically, new industries develop in regional 
clusters around research centers. The German 
Federal Government has supported the develop-
ment of such clusters with the BioRegio con-
test, a competition of regions. All over Ger-
many, 16 BioRegions formed and participated 
in the contest. One of three winning regions, 
the Rheinland region (around Koeln, Duessel-
dorf-the other two winning regions were 
Muenchen and Heidelberg) , is located in 
NRW. In the meantime, in NRW at least two 
other regions emerged where BioTech is cur-
rently developed (Marl and Bielefeld) . 
The support which is badly needed by foreign 
investors is provided by specialized infrastruc-
tures within the regions (Eichener et al. 2000) . 
These infrastructures include 
• technology transfer agencies , 
• research cooperation , 
• general business consulting , 
• patent consulting , 
• seed and venture capital funds , 
• technology centers , 
• marketing activities etc . 
The regions have developed quite different 
strategies to provide these services. Our evalu-
ation of the BioRegio Contest proved that some 
are more and others are less successful : 
  • One strategy is to rely on existing institu-
   tions for economic development coopera-
   tion, consulting, financing etc and to link 
    these institutions into a BioTech-centered
   network (one of the regions following this 
   strategy calls itsself „a virtual enterprise").
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   The other strategy is to create new, tech-
   nology-centered institutions as one-stop-lo-
   cations. This strategy is much more suc-
   cessful than the first strategy because in-
   vestors need one single agency to pilot 
   them through the extremely complicated 
   process of establishing a business rather 
   than being handed from one agency to an-
   other with all the interface problems. 
• Some of the regional infrastructures are 
   provided by public institutions, others are 
   established as private-law corporations.
   The latter strategy is more successful, be-
   cause the institutions can act more flexible 
   and are more success-oriented than public 
   authorities. In one region, the agency was 
   founded as a stock corporation, and the 
   state does not give subsidies for operating 
   the agency but just invested in the stocks 
   (together with regional banks and existing 
firms) . 
• The regional agencies must be strong , 
   they must be sufficiently staffed and they 
   must have a highly qualified (that means : 
   well-paid) personality at the top who has
   access to the highest ranks of local and 
   state government. In one reported case, it 
   was possible for the head of such an agency
   to call a minister and to achieve that an in-
   vestor was given an operation permit 
   within 24 hours by fax (which usually re-
   quired several weeks to months) . 
A brief conclusion of our evaluation of the 
BioRegio Contest was „policy matters". Policy 
matters because new technologies need new 
types of regional infrastructures and policy 
alone can provide these infrastructures. But 
these infrastructures will be successful only if 
the right strategies are chosen and not those 
which require less political strength.
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                             these high-tech villages
Theoretical Explanation 
Japanese investments to Germany form an ex-
tremely close spatial cluster in one single city, 
in Duesseldorf. The regional cluster pattern, 
however, is not exclusively typical for foreign 
investments, it is also typical for young indus-
tries. All over Europe, young industries like 
biotechnology, innovative information technol-
ogy sectors (like artificial intelligence) or air 
and space industries form close regional clus-
ters. These clusters of innovative industries 
and research facilities have been called "islands 
of innovation" which, across the continent, 
form an "archipelago Europe" (Hilpert 1995) . A 
recent comparative study of four European 
countries confirmed that local production sys-
tems based on small firms have played a crucial 
role for structural change and economic growth 
(Crouch et al. 2001) . In North America, a 
similar pattern can be found. BioTech firms 
concentrate on few locations on the East 
Coast, in California, and, with less impor-
tance, Seattle and Chicago. The most promi-
nent example for regional clustering of innova-
tive technologies is still Silicon Valley (Saxenian 
1990,1994) . 
It is puzzling that, in the era of globalization, 
exactly the most innovative technologies, 
where globalization is most advanced, form 
close spatial clusters on a regional or even local 
level. Researchers from all over the world col-
laborate in transnational projects, communicate 
daily by e-mail and other media, publish in in-
ternational journals, meet regularly on world-
wide conferences, start-ups with a handful of 
employees supply customers on all continents. 
On the same time, these scientists and enter-
prises reside in close proximity in village-like 
technology centers or business parks. Some of
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essary conditions for innovation. The French 
regulation theory (Dunford / Kafkalas 1992, 
Moulaert 1996) emphasizes the role of infra-
structures and institutional settings provided by 
local regulatory regimes. 
The common denominator of these theoretical 
approaches is that certain industries are de-
pendent on externalities which are provided on 
a regional level. The theories agree that these 
externalities include "hard" factors like access 
to highly specialized labor markets and, even 
more important, "soft factors" like informal in-
formation exchange or mutual trust and which 
have been called "industrial atmosphere" 
(Pyke, Becattini ad Sengenberger 1990) . Gen-
erally speaking, firms which belong to regional 
clusters are more competetive than firms of the 
same branch which are located in a diaspora. 
The reason for clustering is 
  • that certain industries require resources 
    (including human resources and knowl-
   edge) , infrastructures, supplies, services 
   and partnerships 
  • and that these resources are externalities of 
   businesses and institutions which belong to 
   one supply chain 
• and that many of these resources rely on 
    rather informal, personal contact   
• and that these highly specialized re-
    sources , infrastructures , supplies , serv-
   ices and partnerships can not be found on 
   the global or national markets but evolve
   interdependently in technological districts. 
If all four conditions are true than a structure of 
regional clusters will emerge. Otherwise, if 
only one condition fails, locations spread over 
the country. 
In brief : proximity matters. Some of the rea-
sons of regional clustering-agglomeration and 
proximity-had already been pointed out by clas-
sical regional economics. Furthermore, spillovers
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and both regions were supplied with technol-
ogy-focused contracts of the US Ministry of De-
fense. 
However, in the 1980 ties, when information 
technology business started mushrooming, Sili-
con Valley clearly passed route 128, in terms of 
jobs created and of numbers of fast-growing en-
terprises. From her intervies, Saxenian de-
rives some hypothesises to explain the differ-
ences. Apart from some hypotheses which em-
phasize differences in culture and mentality be-
tween East Coast and West Coast, she names 
two factors refering to regional clustering : 
1. Spatial proximity : In Silicon Valley proxim-
 ity exceeds that of New England so that the 
 frequency of personal contacts was greater. 
2. Associations : In Silicon Valley, the inven-
  tors and starters founded assocations which 
 facilities information and resource ex-
  changes. 
Obviously, only certain industries require re-
gional clustering, and obviously, the impor-
tance of regional clustering diminishes with 
time. E. g. automobile industry in Germany 
started in technological districts. Daimler-Benz 
in Stuttgart was a nucleus for a technological 
cluster of hundred of suppliers and many infra-
structures which developed in physical proxim-
ity. Today, there is absolutely no regional 
clustering of automotive industry anymore. 
Automobile plants which were opened up in the 
1960 ties, like Opel in Bochum, or in the 1990 
ties (like Opel in Eisenach, Volkswagen in Mo-
sel or Daimler-Benz in Bremen) have very few 
ties into the surrounding regions. Mature in-
dustries do not need regional infrastructures 
and resources because they have developed in-
stitutions and to provide all these supplies. The 
big automobile companies have their own re-
search facilities and vocational training cen-
ters, they don't need universities anymore.
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This explains why empirical research shows 
that some regional production systems gradu-
ally erode while others pop up at the same time 
(Crouch et al. 2001) . 
Regional clustering is rather typical for young 
industries, in particular the innovative indus-
tries like biotechnology or, 20 years ago, infor-
mation technology. These young industries do 
not have specialized research facilities or train-
ing centers or marketing agencies, they need 
these infrastructures within spatial proximity. 
Now, we have reached the similarities to for-
eign direct investment. Foreign investors often 
are in a situation comparable to that of a 
start-up. They also have special require-
ments, in particular if they are not familiar 
with the structures in the country where they 
invest. If a Dutch company invests in Germany 
it does not have any special requirements be-
cause structures in the Netherlands and in Ger-
many are rather similar. The language is easy 
to learn, the legal systems are not very differ-
ent, the business techniques are not identical 
but rather close. A Dutch executive would not 
even have problems to send his or her children 
to a German school, a spouse would not have 
problems to find a job. However, if a company 
invests in an „exotic" country they have special 
requirements comparable to the special require-
ments of young industries. 
„Exotic" means : a language barrier, different 
legal structures, different culture, different 
business habits, different management styles. 
For Japanese companies, Germany was quite 
certainly „exotic" in this sense, and for German 
investors in Japan, Japan still is somewhat „ex-
otic". What do investors need in such an „ex-
otic" environment : 
  • They need specialized consultants serving 
   as bridges between both cultures. 
• They need specialized lawyers who are fa-
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   miliar with both legal systems. 
  • They need associations to organize informa-
   tion and resource exchange. 
• They need infrastructures for their private 
   lifes, for their spouses and families like cul-
   tural centers, schools, leisure time facili-
   ties. 
Duesseldorf was the very region in Germany 
(maybe in all Europe) to provide these infra-
structures, and hence, Japanese investments 
formed a close cluster in Duesseldorf. It ist not 
quite clear what the nucleus for Japanese inves-
tors was (maybe a unique combination of an at-
tractive city, an airport, an attractive business 
environment, and-maybe-a catalyst) but quite 
certainly Duesseldorf took the chance and devel-
oped a German-Japanese infrastructure. Once 
started, the process became self-reinforcing : A 
certain number of foreign investments stimu-
lates the development of an infrastructure, and 
in turn the infrastructure attracts further in-
vestments. 
The problem is that a critical mass is required 
to start such a self-reinforcing process. Some-
times, it is mere chance that a regional cluster 
develops around a nucleus like Silicon Valley 
around Stanford university and Hewl-
ett-Packard. On the other hand, politics comes 
into play. By political decisions, regional infra-
structures can be created so that business can 
develop before it has passed the critical mass 
threshold. Technology centers and biotech re-
gions are examples of such policies. Certainly, 
it is very difficult to establish a technological 
district on a blank meadow. Certainly, the 
chances of success increase with the endoge-
nous potentials which can already be found in 
the region. The steps of Nordrhein-Westfalen's 
industrial policy demonstrate who policy gradu-
ally reacted to the findings of regional economy 
or, more probably, to negative and positive
 stment in Nordrhein-Westfalen, Germany —53— 
                                     experiences. 
                                Nowadays, Europe is not "exotic" to Japanese 
                                 investors anymore. Today, the relevance of
                             regional infrastructeres is diminishing. The re-
                             sult is, as the statistical figures indicate, that
                                 Japanese investments are spreading over sev-
                              eral European countries and regions. 
                              If our reasoning is right foreign companies wish-
                             ing to invest in Japan also have special require-
                              ments for infrastructures, and they will form
                               regional clusters whereever in Japan such infra-
                               structures will emerge. This opens space for in-
                              dustrial policy. If government decides to at-
                              tract foreign investments it might be a good 
                              idea to look for a nucleus and to create an infra-
                                structure of "bridge services" around this nu-
                              cleus. The primary objective must be to get a
                               critical mass of foreign investors at one location
                             to make it attractive for others to join the clus-
                                ter. According to our reasoning, providing 
                               cluster-focused infrastructures should be are
                               more successful approach of industrial policy
                            than giving subsidies. 
                              But theory also says that after the initial phase 
                            of establishing bridgeheads and adapting to the
                               new culture, the importance of regional clus-
                                ters will eventually diminish. However, for
                               Japanese investors in Europe, this process took
                                20 years, an Duesseldorf still is a stronghold of
                             Japanese investments in Europe, and obviously 
                                still provides an attractive environment for
                                 Japanese businesses.
Conclusions
Industrial policy has changed greatly during the 
last three decades in Nordrhein-Westfalen, and 
so have the policies to attract foreign direct in-
vestments. Already in the early seventies, the 
traditional passive approach has been replaced 
by an active role of the state to attract and to
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support investors. The traditional incentive 
programmes, which suffered from the „water-
ing-can approach", have been focused on re-
gions, on technologies and branches and, re-
cently, on specific business types. 
And the state has changed its role, too. Of 
course, financial incentives still play an impor-
tant role to attract foreign investors, particu-
larly large-scale investments in traditional indus-
tries like opening a new automotive plant or 
any other large production site. The BioTech 
example shows that innovative industries need 
other, more intricate supports and services 
than sheer money. They need piloting, coop-
eration, consulting, technology and personnel 
transfer. 
Foreign investors have similar needs. They 
also require infrastructures , services , re-
sources and an "atmosphere" or "milieu" which 
can be provided in regional settings only. The 
Japanese-German infrastructure in Duesseldorf 
is an excellent example that regional clusters 
can attract foreign investments, since Duessel-
dorf still hosts 84% of all Japanese companies in 
Nordrhein-Westfalen. 
In Nordrhein-Westfalen, the state (to be ex-
act : the Ministry of Economics) has accepted 
this challenge and has taken over a role of a 
moderator of networks and in particular of net-
works within a regional framework. The re-
sults that can be seen already indicate that this 
new role appears to be more successful than the 
old understanding of the state as a „big 
spender"who gives money but otherwise keeps 
itsself far away from the economy. 
References 
Aydalot, P. 1986 : Milieux Innovateurs en Europe. Paris : 
GREMI. 
Aydalot, P. Keeble, D. 1988 : High Technology Industry and 
Innovative Environments : The European Experience. London, 
New York : Routledge.
             Regional dustrial olicy nd oreign  irect Investment in Nordrhein-Westfalen, Germany
Beise, M. 1998 : High-Tech-Zentren in Europa. EU-Magazin 4 
1998, pp. 33-35. 
Camagni, R. P. 1991 (ed. ) : Innovation Networks : Spatial 
Perspectives. London : Bellhaven. 
Cooke, P. Morgan, K. 1990 : Learning through Networking. 
Regional Industrial Research Report No. 5, Cardiff : University 
of Wales. 
Crouch, C. Le Gales, P. Trigilia, Ca. Voelzkow, H. 2001 : 
Local Production Systems in Europe. Rise or Demise? Oxford : 
Oxford University Press. 
Dunford, M. Kafkalas, G. 1992 (eds. ) : Cities and Regions in 
the New Europe. London : Pinter. 
Eichener, V. Schaaf, S. Schulte, F. Weingarten, J. 2000 : 
Erfolgsfaktoren fur Biotechnologieregionen . Edition der 
Hans-Bockler-Stiftung , vol . 46 . Dusseldorf : Hans-Bock-
ler-Stiftung. 
Ernst&Young 1998 : Continental Shift. Stuttgart : Ernst& 
Young. 
Heinze, R. G. Voelzkow, H. (eds. ) 1997 : Die Regionalis-
ierung der Strukturpolitik in Nordrhein-Westfalen. Opladen : 
Westdeutscher Verlag. 
Hilpert, U. 1995 : Archipelago Europe. European Commission, 
DG XII, FAST Dossier, Brussels. 
Maillat, D. 1995 : Territorial Dynamics, Innovative Milieus and 
Regional Policy. Entrepreneurship and Regional Development, 
7, pp. 157-165. 
Maskell, P. Malmberg, A. 1999 : The Competetiveness of 
Firms and Regions : Ubiquification and the Importance of Lo-
calized Learning. European Urban and Regional Studies, 6 pp. 
9-26. 
Morgan, K. 1997 : The Learning Region : Institutions. Innova-
tion and Regional Renewal. Regional Studies 31 (5), pp. 491-
503. 
Moulaert, F. 1996 : Rediscovering Spatial Inequality in 
Europe : Building Blocks for an Appropriate 'Regulationist' 
Analytical Framework. Environment and Planning D: Society 
and Space, 14, pp. 155-179. 
Piore, M. J. Sabel, C. F. 1984 : The Second Industrial Divide. 
New York : Basic Books. 
Pyke, F. Becattini, G. Sengenberger, W. 1990 (eds. ) : In-
dustrial Districts and Inter-Firm Co-operation in Italy. Ge-
neva : International Institute for Labour Studies. 
Sabel, C. F. 1989 : Flexible Specialization and the Re-emer-
gence of Regional Economies. In : Hirst, P. Zeitlin, J. 
(eds. ) : Reversing Industrial Decline? Oxford : Berg. 
Saxenian, A. 1990 : Regional Networks and the Resurgence of 
the Silicon Valley. In : California Management Review 33, pp. 
89-112.
Regional Industrial Policy and Foreign Direct Investment in Nordrhein-Westfalen, Germany  — 55
Saxenian, A. 1994 : Regional Advantage : Culture and Compe-
tition in Silicon Valley and Route 128. Cambridge, MA : Har-
vard University Press. 
Scott, A. J. 1988 : New Industrial Spaces. London : Pion. 
Scott, A. J. 1999 : The Regional World. Oxford : Oxford Uni-
versity Press. 
Scott, A. J. Storper, M. 1992 : Regional Development Recon-
sidered. in : Ernste, H. Meier, V. (eds. ) : Regional Develop-
ment and Contemporary Industrial Response. London : Bell-
haven. 
Sternberg, R. 1996 : Technology Policies and the Growth of 
Regions. Evidence from four Countries. Small Business Eco-
nomics 8 (2), pp. 75-86. 
Sternberg, R. Behrendt, H. Seeger, H. Tamasy, C. 1996 : 
Bilanz eines Booms. Wirkungsanalyse von Technologie-und 
Grunderzentren in Deutschland. Dortmund. 
Storper, M. 1997 : The Regional World. New York : Guildford. 
Dr Volker Eichener is Professor of Political Science at the 
University of Applied Sciences of Duesseldorf and Director 
of the InWIS Institute on Housing, Urban and Regional De-
velopment at Ruhr University of Bochum.
